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Expiration of private property rights: a note 
 
 
Walter E. Block 
 
 
Abstract: According to libertarian law, upon what occasions may a 
person’s private property rights in goods, commodities, in himself, be 
alienated from him? The present paper is an attempt to wrestle with this 
question. We consider abandonment, punishment, salvage, misplacement, 
liberation of property. 
 





In this essay we will assume, [1] arguendo if need be, that private property rights 
properly come into existence based on homesteading (Bylund 2012; Hoppe 1993, 2011; 
Kinsella 2003, 2006; Locke 1948; Rothbard 1973; Rozeff 2005). We also accept without 
question or analysis how titles to land or goods may be licitly transferred from one 
person to another: through any voluntary process, such as sale, barter, gambling, gifts, 
etc. (Nozick 1974). The only thing precluded would be violations of the non-aggression 
principle (NAP). We will here focus attention not on how such rights come into being 
and/or are relocated amongst people, but on how they may be legitimately extinguished 
over above and against the will of the owner. This paper is predicated upon 
libertarianism; it is an attempt to understand how this philosophical tradition would 
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Abandonment 
 
One obvious way to extinguish property rights [2] is by abandonment. If a man 
relinquishes title to his holdings, that is it for him and them. They now pass once 
again into non-ownership as they were before being homesteaded, either by this person 
or the previous owner(s). And, in this state they are available to the first man who 
comes along and homesteads them on his own account. This is rather non-
controversial. No reasonable person would force people to keep their erstwhile property 
against their will, and no libertarian would object to the ownership of them by the next 
man who comes along and homesteads them. There are those, however, who favor laws 
prohibiting owners of firms from relinquishing title in them. They do so in support of 
labor union members who wish to continue to act the role of a tapeworm against these 
companies. [3] 
 
Precisely in what does such relinquishing consist? Is it through a declarative and 
legally binding act (‘I hereby relinquish my holdings to ...’ which has to be witnessed or 
such like? Yes, that would certainly suffice. Or may one’s acts (or, more likely, 
omissions) be taken as signs of relinquishment? If one, for instance, allows a building 
to fall into disrepair and makes no efforts (despite warnings from others – although 
which others would have to be specified) to rectify this, has one relinquished one’s 
title? Yes, that, too, would constitute a relinquishment. However, we can add, here, ‘not 
so fast.’ If that building falls apart and physically harms other persons, the owner, or, 
rather, the previous owner, would still be fully responsible for the damage, even though 
he had severed connections with the edifice. 
 
And after how long may one be deemed to have relinquished the title? We deal with 





B steals a car from A. According to libertarian punishment theory, at the very least, in 
addition to compelling B to return this automobile to A, the same thing must be done 
to B as he did to A. Namely, B must be forced to give to A a vehicle of his own, or if he 
does not have one of comparable value, then the monetary equivalent thereof. That is to 
say, it is entirely appropriate to end the criminal’s right to some property of his own. 
Given that the death penalty for murder is justified (Block 2003A, 2003B, 2003C, 
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2006A, 2006B, 2006C; Rothbard 2010; Whitehead and Block 2003), not only may the 
criminal forfeit physical property, he would be called upon to give up title to the most 
important piece of private property he owns, namely that to his own person. We 
conclude that the property rights of murderers and thieves may be justifiably taken 
from them. For this philosophy, property rights are indeed sacrosanct. But not so much 
that they may not be taken away from criminals, as part of their punishment. Take the 
case of slavery as an example. What should have happened in 1865 in the U.S. is that 
slavery should have been considered as a crime; no ex post facto excuse should have 
been accepted. These owners were guilty of kidnapping. Even though entirely legal at 
the time, slavery is one of the most egregious violations of the NAP. The punishment 
for this crime, at the very least, should have involved the transfer of the lands and 
other property from these criminals to their victims, the (ex) slaves. This would have 





C owns a large craft. An iceberg comes along and puts a hole in it. C leaves his sinking 
ship and heads for shore in a canoe, but does not abandon title to it. As far as he is 
concerned, it is lost to him. C has not the means nor ability to bring it back to the 
surface of the ocean and/or he tries to do so but unsuccessfully. D enters upon the scene 
and salvages this vessel. According to maritime law, D now owns one-third of the value 
of this yacht. That is, it is not the case that it would be nice if C paid a reward to D for 
this service at his discretion. Rather, the former now owns 2/3 of this property, the 
latter 1/3. It is not up to C to determine how much money, if any, he should give to D 
for returning his possession. This has been determined by the private court. 
 
We shall not touch upon the question of whether maritime law got the percentages 
right. Perhaps the division should have been, instead, 50% - 50%, or 60% - 40%, or 40% - 
60%, or 70% - 30%, or some other. Let it stand at 66.6% for C and 33.4% for D, since there 
is historical precedent (Anderson 1993; Doane 2013; Kinsella 2010; Lipka 1970; Wilder 
2000) for this partition. The issue of relevance for the present paper is that C loses, 
against his will, not the entire boat, but, rather, one third of its value. 
 
Is this justified from the libertarian point of view? Here, we reach something of a 
quandary, for there are not one but two principles emanating from the non-aggression 
principle (NAP) of libertarianism, and they, unhappily, lead us in opposite directions. 
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On the one hand, we have the presumption that private property rights are forever; that 
they may not be seized from the owner against his will (assuming no abandonment, no 
relinquishment, no criminal behavior, etc.) On the other hand, and, here, there is 
another hand, there is the fact that a private court has found on the opposite side of the 
issue, and the decisions of this institution also lie at the core of the libertarian 
philosophy. (Another basic premise of libertarianism is that when there seems to be a 
clash of rights, at least of them is invalid.) My judgment here is to award this seeming 
tie [5] to the principle, not the judicial finding: property rights are inviolate, and D is 
not entitled to any of C’s boat without the latter’s consent.  For example, C may offer a 
reward of a certain amount of money, or a given percentage of the value of the lost 
boat, to any would-be salvager. Alternatively, if there is an owner of the ocean (Block 
and Nelson, forthcoming) he will likely provide a definitive ruling in this regard. As 
part of the price of entry C will have in effect agreed to this, and thus contractually 
obligated himself to be bound by them.  
 
Why do I tip the balance in this direction? I do so because is it always possible, 
plausible, defensible, to ask, an otherwise legitimate private court [6] made thus and 
such a determination, but is it really in accord with the NAP? Whereas, in contrast, it 
does not trip as lightly off the tongue to question private property rights, the very 
bedrock of libertarianism.  Suttee is a practice that is clearly incompatible with the 
NAP of libertarianism. Yet, it takes no great deal of imagination to suppose that were 
there private courts in India during those epochs they would have supported this 
system. 
 
However, suppose that C insists that no one should salvage his ship, and/or that he, C, 
will not pay a dime to anyone who does. May this vessel languish at the bottom of the 
sea forever? No. Eventually, there is a continuum (Block and Barnett 2008) problem 
here that can only be addressed by courts, he or his heirs if need by will be deemed to 
have abandoned this boat, and anyone else would be free to rescue this property without 
paying anything at all to C.  It is crucially important to recognize that not all legal 
findings can be directly deduced from the libertarian NAP.  Courts, judges, hopefully 
private ones who have passed a market weeding out test (Hazlitt 1946), will have to 
make such determinations. This holds particularly trued to timing: precisely how long 
will it take before abandoned property is deemed to be no longer owned. No libertarian 
principle can serve as the basic premise from which specific number of years can be 
deduced. The judicial market will have to make all such determinations. 
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Such decisions will undoubtedly give rise to a bargaining situation between the Cs and 
the Ds of the world. Perhaps this is reflected in the 33.3% that the private courts had 
determined upon. But if the courts deem that anyone may salvage the boat and keep it, 
why should that lead to a bargaining situation? It might be argued that the potential 
salvagers do not need to bargain with the owner/heirs if anyone may now retrieve the 
boat and keep it. This is false, because the courts will only make this determination at 
time x. The bargaining will take place before that cut off time period. 
 
The argument for salvage is further weakened when what is rescued is not property, but 
a human being. Consider the following case:  B, the bad guy kidnaps A, the victim. C, 
the hero, rescues A from B. [7] According to salvage precedents, A owes C one third of 
the value of her life. According the view being put forth in the present paper, C may 
not enslave A at all, even to the extent of one-third, [8] since her title in her own self 
may not be vanquished by anyone: certainly not by B and not even by C (to any extent).  
However, her self-ownership rights in herself may be ended by one and only person: 
herself. This is based on the libertarian case for ‘voluntary slavery.’ [9] 
 
Let us consider some criticisms of this section of the paper. Here, decisions of courts or 
legislators enter the argument. But what is the normative force of these for 
libertarians? Private maritime courts might not get it right, according to libertarians, 
so perhaps the libertarian would simply say that property rights are eternal, and the 
court’s view is invalid.  
 
Response: it is always possible to ask of a court decision, but, is it compatible with the 
NAP. In  the case of a court upholding suttee, or slavery, or rape, the judge has clearly 
made a mistake. On the other hand, there are decisions about which the operation of 
the NAP is not clear. For example, statutory rape laws. We all know full well that if a 
man goes to bed with a five year old girl, even if she gives ‘consent’ he is a statutory 
rapist. This is because we do not believe that a child of that age, even if she is very 
smart, has the maturity to give consent to such an act. On the other hand, if this man 
has intercourse with a willing twenty-five year old woman, he is not guilty of statutory 
or any other kind of rape. But where shall the line be drawn? Shall it be at fifteen 
years of age? But why not fourteen or sixteen? The answer to this continuum problem 
(Block and Barnett 2008) does not emanate, certainly not directly, from the non-
aggression principle of libertarians. All supporters of this philosophy would say, 
correctly, that only (private) courts should make such a determination. Most would be 
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content with ages 14-19, and a few with anywhere from 12-21. But, outside of these 
limits, again we could validly question any age as being compatible with the NAP. 
 
Query: why would an owner of the ocean have the right to provide a definitive ruling? 
If a crime is committed in someone’s back garden, does this give him, rather than a 
court, the right to rule on the case? Yes, indeedy do, would be the response of the 
libertarian: The owner gets to decide the rules in his domain. Every man’s home is his 
castle. Private property rights are sacrosanct. Now, there are of course limitations. No 
one can invite you to his back garden, murder you, and claim that in his property he is 
allowed to shoot anyone who displeases him. However, he may do precisely that, 
provide only that he clearly warns people of the special rules that prevail in his justly 
owned territory. Consider ‘murder park’ in this regard. I open a new kind of amusement 
park. It has 20-foot thick walls so that no bullets can pierce them. I issue a gun and six 
bullets to all clients, and tell them they may shoot each other for the next 50 minutes, 
when a bell will ring. Then, no shooting is allowed. I cart out the dead bodies, issue 
new bullets to those who wish to remain, and introduce new shooters during the next 
ten minutes. After that two bells ring, and we have our next free for all. Would such an 
emporium be legal in the libertarian society? Of course it would. And no heir of any of 
those killed (not murdered) in the melee would have the right to sue for wrongful 
death. 
 
Here is another objection: there are great dissimilarities between this kidnapping case 
and the boat example; the simple impracticality of owning one-third of a person makes 
the two cases disanalogous (unless, of course, we can put a monetary value on a person’s 
life and have the ‘salvager’ of the life being paid this monetary amount as a condition 
of ‘freeing’ the one-third of the slave whom the salvager now partly owns; though what 
if the salvager refuses to accept this price?).  Legal scholars always exercise caution in 
applying the law in one area to another, and a little more judiciousness in the making 
of the analogy between boats and people would be welcome here. 
 
Response. There is no great difficulty in owning one third, or two thirds of a person. 
For example, slave owner A would have the services of this person for two months in a 
row, and B for one month. In this way, any proportions could be accommodated. For 
example, if A owns 10% of the slave and B 90%, they distributed his services one day for 
A, nine days for B, and then repeat. [10] Of course we can place a monetary value on 
human lives, easily during the epochs when this vicious and depraved system was legal. 
This is precisely what auctions and sales and purchases did. As to ‘applying the law in 
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one area to another’ this is perhaps one of libertarian’s unique and important 
contributions to philosophy. For example, consider the case of reconciling the non-
discrimination aspects of the so called Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the law of free 
association. It applies only to commercial interactions, not personal ones. Thus, it 
would be illegal to refuse service in a restaurant to a black person, but entirely legal 
not to marry or date a member of that racial community. But this is highly 
problematic. In the libertarian philosophy, the law is the law is the law. There should 
be no invidious distinctions of this sort. Murder, rape and theft are equally invidious 
whether conducted in the home or at the office or factory. If free association is to be 
upheld in our personal lives, and of course it should be, then logical consistency 
implies the same rules should hold true in business relationships. Pure logic requires 
that free association be allowed in either both cases or none. Libertarianism stipulates 
the former. Or take the case of the baker or the photographer refusing the custom of 
homosexuals who want to marry. Were the legal finding that they be compelled to do so 
applied to personal relationships, this would imply compulsory bi-sexuality, since they 
are the only ones who do not discriminate, in their personal lives, on the basis of 
gender (of course these people do discriminate on the basis of beauty, sense of humor, 
personality, so they too would be considered criminals were our laws logical).  While of 
course caution must always be exercised, logical consistency in law is to be applauded, 





E loses his wallet. He does so on unowned land, so that no landowner’s rules can 
obviate the conundrums we are now trying to create. F sees the wallet lying there and 
picks it up. What legal obligation, if any, does F have to return this piece of property to 
E? According to the ‘finders keepers, losers weepers’ perspective, F has none at all. But 
is this aphorism compatible with libertarianism? One strike against it, of course, is 
that it would support the separation of E and his justly owned billfold. This is 
something not lightly countenanced by the freedom philosophy. On the other hand, 
there is the libertarian postulate of no positive obligations. Under this legal system, we 
are obligated, only, to refrain from violating the rights of others. Good Samaritanism 
is supererogatory; virtuous, but by no means required. Why should  F bestir himself to 
go to the aid of E in this manner to return his lost property to him?  There are only 
negative rights under laissez faire capitalism, not positive ones. As long as F did not 
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himself pickpocket the wallet from E, or work with any accomplice to this end, he is 
not legally obligated to return it to him. 
 
But suppose E shows up on F’s doorstep and asks him to return his missing billfold 
(Don’t ask how E learned that F had found his wallet; perhaps this was an act of God, 
or intuition, or a coincidence or accident). Then F does have a legal obligation to 
oblige. (Libertarianism is concerned only with what the law should be, what is the 
proper use of violence, not with morality; on the latter basis, of course, F is required to 
return E’s property to him forthwith.) For in this case the act he must undertake 
implies so little effort on his part as to nullify the positive obligation objection. F need 
not engage in any activity at all. The only thing required of him would be to allow E to 
repossess his wallet, which we may suppose is lying there in clear sight. If F prohibits 
E from repossessing his own wallet, F would be guilty of theft.   
 
But why must E do all this work, ferreting out F, pleading with him for the return of 
his property? [11] Can we not push the envelope further in the direction of supporting 
E’s private property rights? We cannot. It does not at all depend upon just how 
difficult it is for F to find E. Even if all the former has to do is telephone or e mail the 
latter, since this information is readily available in the wallet, he still need not do so, 
at least according to the interpretation of libertarianism now being offered, for this 
would be a violation of the rule of no positive obligations. If great detective work is 
called for on the part of F, then he certainly need not undertake this onerous 
responsibility.  
 
Of course, we may well ask on whose property was the wallet lost?  In the free society, 
every square inch of territory would be privately owned: streets, sidewalks, roads 
(Block 2009), parks, museums, schools, garbage dumps, forests, etc. Very likely, land 
owners would anticipate the lost wallet phenomenon, and set out rules to cover such 
eventualities. Presumably, these would require that finders make all reasonable efforts 
to find the rightful owners and return their property to them. Profit and loss 
considerations would nudge real estate holders in this direction.  There would probably 
be a rule in effect mandating that the finder turn in the billfold to the private police 
(Tinsley 1998-1999) and would only keep it after a year or so had passed during which 
unsuccessful efforts would be made to ascertain the identity of the owner. 
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We ignore this possibility so as to be able to probe more deeply into libertarian theory. 
Implicitly, and now explicitly, we are supposing that the wallet was found on sub 
marginal and hence unowned land. Only then can pure libertarian law function in the 
absence of explicit rules set out by property owners. 
 
 
Liberation of property 
 
A woman, G is walking along an unowned path, whereupon the evil H snatches her 
purse. J, our hero, chases after the criminal and grabs the pocketbook back from him. 
At this point, H disappears from the scene, lest he unduly complicate matters. If he can 
be found, the libertarian analysis is much more straightforward. He will be severely 
punished for his uncivilized deeds, and made to fully compensate his victim. 
 
So, must J return the pocketbook to G so as to act compatibly with libertarianism? I 
answer in the same manner as the lost wallet: again, there are no positive obligations, 
but if J can do so without obliging himself, he must do so. If J chases H only a few feet, 
and relieves H of G’s wallet, then it would be easy for J to return it to G. Were J to 
keep it for himself, and not return it to G, J would then start to look a bit like the 
abominable H. On the other hand, suppose J has to pursue H for 26.2 miles, marathon 
distance before he can get the latter to disgorge his ill-gotten gains. [12] Must J, our 
hero, trudge back that entire distance to return these stolen goods to G? Not a bit of it. 
For one thing, even at world class marathon time it would take over four hours for J to 
make the round trip; by the time he returned to the scene of the crime, G might well be 
long gone. Similarly to the previous case, if G’s identity is readily available, and all J 
need do is telephone, or e mail or skype her, then he is obliged to do so.  If this is not 
relatively easily accessible, then G is out of luck, unless she has some way to ferret out 
J. Only in this way can we reconcile G’s stake in non-relinquishment of her property 





Ragnar is my favorite hero of Ayn Rand’s (1957) book, Atlas Shrugged. My man 
Danneskjold is a ‘pirate.’ Quotes around that word to indicate that he does not steal 
property from honest owners (Leeson 2007, 2011), but, rather, liberates stolen property 
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from a band of robbers and thieves, the government of course (Spooner 1870). Indeed, it 
is impossible to rob a thief [13]; one can only relieve him of his ill-gotten gains. 
 
What does Ragnar do with the wealth he takes from the state? He gives it to another 
hero in the book, Hank Reardon. Here, Ragnar is returning stolen property, since the 
premise of this novel is that the government has improperly seized wealth from Hank. 
But, suppose, Ragnar did not do this. Posit, instead, he kept these goods, stolen from 
Reardon in the first place, and then commandeered by him, Ragnar, from the bad guy 
Federales? Assume, further, that Ragnar was born on Mars [14] and thus could not 
offer as a justification for his confiscation of government ships that the state had 
stolen from his parents. 
 
As we have seen in our case of the pocketbook, heterogeneous material such as stolen 
paintings, wallets, identifiable jewelry must be returned to their rightful owners. [15] 
But money is fungible. So, neither Reardon, nor any Tom, Dick or Harry, may not 
approach Ragnar and demand 1/300millionth of the gold of which he has relieved the 
government. (In order for this figure to make sense, we assume the government steals 
through – unjustified - taxation an equal amount from each of its 300 million 
taxpayers.).  How could such a claimant prove that it was his money that Ragnar had 
commandeered from the state? 
 
Let us move from the world of fiction to one a bit closer to reality.  Consider the case 
where a libertarian works for the government, say, as a professor, or runs for political 
office and accepts matching funds (Block 2007C) from the state. Whereupon an 
opponent of libertarianism approaches him and demands that the libertarian return 
some of this wealth to him, since, according to that philosophy, it was stolen from him. 
Is the libertarian required to do so, if he is to remain consistent with his own 
principles?  The obvious practical implication of this demand, if it is upheld, is that it 
would be exceedingly difficult for the libertarian to benefit from such decisions, since 
any funds he obtains thereby will become forfeit to the enemies of liberty.  Then, he 
would be less likely to engage in them. 
 
There are several objections available to the libertarian. First, he could say to the 
critic, ‘Hey, go liberate your own money from the government, if you want to follow 
this precept. They have plenty to go around: all that they improperly took at the point 
of a gun from the populace.’ But the ‘progressive’ is not without a response. He can 
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reply: ‘Yes, but they are a bunch of thieves, according to you. It is dangerous to attack 
them. But you, Ragnar, hold yourself out as a libertarian. You would not use violence 
against me for merely asking you to be true to your own principles.’ Whereupon a 
second round response. Take the case where Ragnar is about to blow up the Nazi 
garage, filled with automobiles of oppression. Along comes an ‘innocent’ German who 
objects to this act on the ground that one of the jeeps was stolen from him by the Nazis. 
Assume there is no way to dispatch this armory without also destroying that particular 
vehicle. The libertarian response is that the person who objects to this fire-bombing is 
no longer innocent himself. In protesting against this justified act of Ragnar’s, he 
reveals himself as objectively in support of the Nazi regime. [16] In like manner, the 
‘liberal’ [17] who demands an aliquot share of the salary of the libertarian who teaches 
in a public university [18] demonstrates that he does not come to this little tableau 
with fully clean hands, and it is only such a person who deserves to have his property 
returned to him. (E.g., if it can be demonstrated in the case considered supra that the 
woman whose purse was snatched is herself a criminal, then all bets are off in terms of 
her claim to receive this bit of property.) He is objectively guilty of trying to 
undermine this process of fighting for justice. 
 
Let us summarize thus far. Ragnar liberates property. A leftie demands it, or at least 
his proportional share. He does so, since he does not like Ragnar, he supports the state, 
and correctly sees that our ‘pirate’ is undermining this institution. Ragnar can say, 
sure, I’ll give you a share, after I give it to others who have also been stolen from. But 
the leftie can reply, ‘I want my proportional (1/300 million, the approximate size of the 
US population) share right now. But he then reveals himself as a member of the ruling 
class, since his purpose is to undermine Ragnar’s liberation of state property. 
 
Property titles may not licitly be extinguished by theft (or kidnapping). They are never 
ended by legitimate law (there is no proper statute of limitations on punishing 
criminals). 
 
Then, third, the libertarian is not without a reductio ad absurdum of his own: in the 
modern era, the state apparatus has immersed itself into virtually every aspect of life. 
Short of committing suicide, or becoming a total hermit, it is impossible to exist 
without accepting government ‘largesse,’ and in so doing becoming a target for this type 
of critic of libertarianism. For example, who among us does not use government roads, 
or government sidewalks, or government parks, or government museums, or government 
symphony halls, or government fiat currency, or … the list goes on and on. Even eating 
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food constitutes a violation in this regard, given subsidies by our favorite organization, 
yes, government. 
 
Fourth, and perhaps the most powerful rejoinder in defense of Ragnar refusing to 
relinquish his properly seized government property, is that there is no warrant for 
saying that he is required to do so on a proportional basis. That is, he need not give one 
300millionth of every penny he commandeers to everyone in the nation. Rather, he may 
pick and choose. He may return this property to those he thinks most deserving, 
without abrogating any libertarian principle. There are also de minimus issues. 
Dividing anything by 300 million tends to reduce its value to a pittance, something not 
worth distributing since the costs of doing so would likely be greater than the value of 
that which is supposedly to be dispersed. If the state steals a specific item from a 
victim, all is well and good from the point of view of the critic of Ragnar: he is obliged 
to return it, subject to considerations mentioned above. But, professors’ salaries, and 
matching funds, are in the form of money: there is no way Ragnar’s critic can prove 
that these particular monies were mulcted from him. 
 
 
Appendix: The importance of property rights for economics 
 
Private property rights are the be all and end all of economics; they are the bedrock of 
the dismal science. Let us take perhaps the most widely used model in all of this 
discipline as a jumping off point: supply and demand. Deep within the bowels of this 
concept are property rights. The demand curve, for instance, is a locus of points in 
price and quantity space depicting how much product the buyer will purchase at 
different or alternative prices. But an implicit premise of this entire enterprise, rarely 
discussed because it is so obvious, is that the seller owns the good in question; once the 
transaction is completed, the vendor will no longer be the proprietor of that which he 
sold, but the new buyer will. Ditto for the supply curve: the supplier now owns the 
good, and will relinquish control over it once the commercial transaction is 
consummated. Property rights also enter the picture when the economist analyzes why 
some countries are rich and others not. It is not quite accurate to say that Smith (1776, 
IV.2.9) gave a two word answer to this question, ‘property rights,’ but it is almost 
correct. In perhaps his most famous statement, he wrote: ‘But the annual revenue of 
every society is always precisely equal to the exchangeable value of the whole annual 
produce of its industry, or rather is precisely the same thing with that exchangeable 
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value. As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his 
capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its 
produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the 
annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends 
to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring 
the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; 
and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest 
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always 
the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he 
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the 
public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very 
few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.’ What is this other than the 
claim that each individual is striving mightily to increase the value of his property? 
More recent economists have followed up on this lead and have attempted to account 
for the same phenomenon: the divergent amounts of wealth enjoyed by different 
countries. And, their  (Gwartney, 1976) analysis has shown, once again, that private 
property is crucial. In those countries where people are more free to use these rights 
(low taxes, little regulation, free trade in goods both domestically and internationally, 
ease of using property to set up businesses) they are richer, and their wealth is growing 
at a greater rate. When property rights are denigrated (e.g., Venezuela, North Korea, 
Cuba), the opposite results occur.  
 
Proudhon famously stated that ‘Property is theft.’ [19] This is wrong in several 
different dimensions. The point is, without property, there can be no such thing as 
theft. The former is entirely dependent upon the latter for its very existence. For, theft 
is the unjustified taking of private property. If there were no such thing as the latter, 
the former could not exist either. Under a regime without private property, everything 
would be owned in common. There would be no such thing as ‘mine’ and ‘thine.’ If A 
grabbed the food out of B’s mouth, the latter could not complain about any theft, for it 
is by no means clear that B is entitled to ownership rights over the food in dispute. 
There could not even be any such thing as murder or rape, since the former is the theft 
of a person’s property in his own body, and the latter is an invasion of, or a trespass on, 
the property rights we all hold in our own bodies. But without property understood in 
this manner, no one could object to being murdered or raped, since it is not clear we 
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own our own bodies. No, rather, it is clear that we do not have property rights in our 
own persons, since there is no such a thing as property rights, at least for Proudhon 




[1] I thank Matt Gilliland for interviewing me on this subject, and for contributing to 
my thinking about it. I am also grateful to several referees of this journal for 
important contributions. All errors of omission or commission of course lie with the 
author. 
[2] The importance of property rights for economics cannot possibly be overstated. See 
appendix for an elaboration of this claim. 
[3] See on this Hutt 1989; Petro 1957; Reynolds 1984. For a libertarian analysis of 
abandoning property, see Block and Nelson, forthcoming. 
[4] For libertarian justifications of reparations to the children and grandchildren of 
slaves, see Alston and Block 2007; Block 1993, 2001A, 2002A; Block and Yeatts 1999-
2000. 
[5] See on this Machan 2010; Rand 1963; Rothbard 2005; Steiner 1994; Touchstone 2010 
[6] Benson 1989, 1990; Berman and Dasser 1990; Marcus 2009; Olson 1979; Popeo 1988; 
Rothbard 1973; Tannehill 2001; Young 2002. 
 
[7] A, B and C are persons. 
 
[8] Whatever that would mean. 
 
[9] See on this: Andersson 2007; Block 1969, 1979, 1999, 2001B, 2002B, 2003D, 2004, 
2005, 2006B, 2007A, 2007B, 2009A, 2009B; Boldrin and Levine 2008; Frederick 2014; 
Kershnar 2003; Lester 2000; Mosquito 2014;  Nozick 1974, pp. 58, 283, 331; Steiner 
1994, p. 232; Thomson 1990. 
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[10] It should not be necessary to say this, but perhaps in our politically correct times it 
would be better to do so: the analysis in the text does not imply that the present author 
favors slavery. 
 
[11] I owe this question to David Luntz. 
 
[12] Again H disappears from our consideration. 
 
[13] One can only steal from the rightful owner. 
 
[14] As was Heinlein’s (1961) hero, Michael. 
 
[15] Subject to limitations imposed by the libertarian proscription of positive 
obligations mentioned above, of course. 
 
[16] He is defending the Nazis against Ragnar’s attempt to deprive them of their 
transportation. 
 
[17] In the 20th and 20st century understanding of this term. 
 
[18] Or a private one, significantly supported by the government through subsidies, 
‘contracts,’ etc. And/or one which is a member of the ruling class, according to the 
libertarian understanding of that phenomenon. See on this Block 2006; Burris 2012; 
Domhoff 1967, 1971, 1998; Donaldson and Poynting 2007; Grinder and Hagel 1977; 
Hoppe 1990; Hughes 1977; Kolko 1963; Mises 1978; Oppenheimer 1975; Raico 1977; 
Richman 2006; Rockwell 2001; Rothbard 2011. 
 
[19] Proudhon (1840, p. 131); Edwards (1969, p. 124): ‘If I had to answer the question 
‘What is slavery?’ and if I were to answer in one word, ‘Murder,’ I would immediately 
be understood. I would not need to use a lengthy argument to demonstrate that the 
power to deprive a man of his thoughts, his will and his personality is a power of life 
and death, and that to enslave a man is to murder him. Why, then, to the question 
‘What is property?’ may I not likewise reply ‘theft,’ without knowing that I am certain 
to be misunderstood, even though the second proposition is simply a transformation of 
the first?’ 
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